SYS / 02 — SecurityPrimary review document

Security & responsibility

Make the boundary
explicit.

Security is a set of controls with named owners—not a property inherited from a model. Start with what we own, what your environment owns, and what must be agreed together.

OWNER / 01

Our responsibility

The design and implementation of agreed system components, their control behavior and the evidence needed to review them.

OWNER / 02

Customer environment

Identity, infrastructure, data authority, source-system permissions and policies outside the agreed implementation scope.

OWNER / 03

Shared responsibility

Threat modeling, scope decisions, acceptance testing, dependency review and approval of changes across the boundary.

Scope is established per engagement.The controls below describe our engineering method, not a claim that a particular deployment already implements every control. Unassigned controls remain open review items and block affected production use.
CONTROL / 01

Access & identity

An authenticated user is not an unrestricted execution context. Every supported request needs a traceable human or service principal.

Access & identity / ownership specification
OwnerRequired responsibility
We are responsibleWe implement principal propagation, authentication validation and authorization checks at the agreed interfaces. Missing or invalid identity is rejected.
Customer environmentThe customer owns the identity provider, joiner and leaver processes, service-account lifecycle and access-review decisions.
SharedAgree identity mappings, emergency-access rules and revocation behavior. Test expired, revoked and mismatched credentials across each execution path.
Boundary conditionIdentity outage must not create an anonymous or elevated fallback path.
CONTROL / 02

Least privilege

Permissions attach to a specific action and resource—not to the apparent intent of a conversation.

Least privilege / ownership specification
OwnerRequired responsibility
We are responsibleWe implement deny-by-default action checks, scoped tool adapters and explicit approval gates for agreed high-impact operations.
Customer environmentThe customer sets business authority, grants source-system permissions and designates people allowed to approve consequential actions.
SharedInventory actions and scopes; test cross-workload access, replay and privilege escalation. Bind approvals to the exact action, resource and relevant parameters.
Boundary conditionA prompt cannot grant access. Generated content and retrieved instructions cannot override policy.
CONTROL / 03

Secrets management

A secret is an execution dependency, not context for the model.

Secrets management / ownership specification
OwnerRequired responsibility
We are responsibleWe use approved secret references and scoped injection in the agreed components. We exclude credentials from prompts, ordinary logs and returned tool output.
Customer environmentThe customer owns the secret store, key policy, service-account grants, rotation authority and infrastructure access unless explicitly included in scope.
SharedConfirm credential lifetime, rotation and revocation paths. Test secret-store failure and verify that redaction works at logs, errors and tool boundaries.
Boundary conditionDo not share production credentials during an initial review. Missing secrets cause refusal, not fallback to a broader credential.
CONTROL / 04

Data boundaries

Document where information enters, which components can process it, and every approved route by which it may leave.

Data boundaries / ownership specification
OwnerRequired responsibility
We are responsibleWe implement agreed input minimization, scoped retrieval, output handling and destination restrictions. Model and tool output remain untrusted.
Customer environmentThe customer classifies data, establishes processing authority and approves environments, model providers, subprocessors and network destinations.
SharedReview data flows, permitted payload classes, provider terms, derived memory, deletion behavior and backup constraints. Confirm location requirements individually before release.
Boundary conditionNo hosting location is represented here. An approved model does not make all data suitable for that model.
CONTROL / 05

Audit & retention

Evidence is useful only when its scope, access and gaps are understood.

Audit & retention / ownership specification
OwnerRequired responsibility
We are responsibleWe define correlated decision and outcome events, redaction rules and the behavior of in-scope components when required audit delivery fails.
Customer environmentThe customer owns retention periods, legal-hold requirements, authorized readers and the storage controls of the selected audit destination.
SharedAgree the evidence required for each action, buffer limits, access review and deletion verification. Test missing records and recovery from sink interruption.
Boundary conditionRetention is not indefinite by default. Do not assume operational logs constitute a complete audit record.
CONTROL / 06

Model & supplier change control

A provider or model change is a dependency change. It can alter behavior, data handling and failure characteristics.

Model & supplier change control / ownership specification
OwnerRequired responsibility
We are responsibleWe version model routes, tool contracts, prompts and policy configuration in scope. We define checks that compare changes against an approved baseline.
Customer environmentThe customer approves providers, account terms, data-processing conditions and internal procurement or risk requirements.
SharedReview proposed changes, evaluate representative and adversarial inputs, document acceptance and preserve a compatible rollback path. Treat upstream unpinned changes as review triggers.
Boundary conditionNo silent widening of scope or automatic provider substitution. If a previous route is unavailable, stop or use a separately approved fallback.
REVIEW / 07

What must be resolved before release.

Approve a written responsibility map, not just an architecture drawing. Any control without an owner, a test or an accepted handling rule remains unresolved.

  • Data-flow and trust-boundary diagram with approved external destinations.
  • Action inventory, principal mappings and resource-level permission matrix.
  • Evidence for denied actions, expired identity, boundary failure and unavailable audit storage.
  • Agreed secret handling, retention, provider changes and incident escalation ownership.
  • Rollback procedure covering in-flight work and downstream side effects.